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OPINION 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Appellant Akiva Sapir appeals the District Court’s order granting Appellee Vadim 
Shulman’s motion for a preliminary injunction and enjoining Sapir from transferring 
funds he holds in two Swiss bank accounts and selling or encumbering an apartment he 
owns in Monaco.  Because we cannot conduct a meaningful review, we vacate and 
remand.  
I. 
 As we write for the parties, we set forth only those facts necessary to our opinion.  
In an amended complaint filed in May of 2012, Shulman alleged that Sapir defrauded 
him of at least $6.5 million during a series of transactions between the two men, 
particularly a sale of steel equipment in 2001.  In June of 2012, Shulman filed a Motion 
for Expedited Relief seeking to enjoin Sapir from transferring funds from the 
aforementioned bank accounts and selling the apartment in order to prevent him from  
3 
 
dissipating assets prior to judgment.  Shulman and Sapir each submitted affidavits before 
the District Court asserting opposing versions of the 2001 steel equipment sale and their 
relationship.  Regarding the 2001 transaction, Shulman contends that Sapir misled him—
with fraudulent documents—about the purchase price and financing of the equipment in 
order to obtain and keep the money Shulman paid in excess of the real purchase price and 
necessary financing.  Sapir asserts that Shulman was aware of the purchase price and that 
he (Sapir) did not obtain money without Shulman’s knowledge.  Sapir also raised a 
number of legal challenges to Shulman’s claims, including Shulman’s standing to bring 
several claims.   
 The District Court held a hearing on June 21, 2012.  Neither party sought to 
present additional evidence or live testimony.  That day the Court issued a three-and-a-
half page order concluding that the elements meriting a preliminary injunction had been 
met, and enjoined Sapir as to the two accounts and the Monaco apartment.  Sapir timely 
filed this appeal. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 1331 
and 1367.  We have appellate jurisdiction to review an interlocutory injunction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  We generally review a district court’s decision to grant or 
deny a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, but examine the findings of fact for 
clear error and evaluate the court’s conclusions of law under a plenary standard.  New 
Jersey Retail Merchs. Ass’n v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 374, 385 (3d Cir. 2012).  
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 Among other arguments, Sapir contends that the District Court erred by issuing 
the injunction without stating its factual findings and legal conclusions as required by 
Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Shulman responds that Sapir waived 
this argument by failing to raise it in the District Court and that the record provides 
adequate support for the Court’s Order.  
III. 
 Rule 52(a)(1) provides that ―[i]n an action tried on the facts without a jury or with 
an advisory jury, the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law 
separately.‖  Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1).  A court ―granting or refusing an interlocutory 
injunction‖ must ―state the findings and conclusions that support its action.‖  Id. 52(a)(2).   
In addition, when a court issues a preliminary injunction, Rule 65(d)(1)(A) requires it to 
―state the reasons why.‖ 
 Compliance with Rule 52(a) is ―of the highest importance to a proper review of 
the action of a court in granting or refusing a preliminary injunction,‖ and is ―obviously 
necessary to the intelligent and orderly presentation and proper disposition of an appeal.‖  
Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1940).  For us to 
review a district court’s findings, that court must do more than declare its conclusion; it 
must state the findings necessary to reach that conclusion.  O’Neill v. United States, 411 
F.2d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 1969).  We may review the materials in the record to ascertain the 
basis of a district court’s order, but we are not bound to do so.  Educational Testing 
Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 1986); 9C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur 
R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2577, at 304 (3d ed. 2008).  
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 Sapir does not contend that he raised this issue before the District Court.  It is true 
that we have held that Rule 52(a) ―does not differ from any of the other trial court errors 
which are waived when no objection is raised in the district court.‖  Danny Kresky 
Enters. Corp. v. Magid, 716 F.2d 206, 215 (3d Cir. 1983).  That case involved the appeal 
of a District Court’s decision to continue a permanent injunction previously entered 
where ―the defect complained of could have been readily corrected had the matter been 
called to the district court’s attention.‖  Id. at 214.  More importantly, unlike in Danny 
Kresky, the record here fails to provide ―a sufficient basis for us to fulfill our review 
function,‖ as it allows for competing inferences we are not permitted to make in the first 
instance.  Id. at 215.  
 Thus, ―[w]hile a party may waive the compliance issue, we nonetheless must 
examine the findings to ascertain if they are adequate to explain sufficiently the basis for 
the injunction so that we can perform our review function.‖  Katzman, 793 F.2d at 537 
(citing Professional Plan Exam’rs of N.J., Inc. v. Lefante, 750 F.2d 282, 289 (3d Cir. 
1984)).  ―[I]f the record does not provide a sufficient basis to ascertain the legal and 
factual grounds for issuing the injunction or if the findings are inadequate to explain the 
basis for that ruling or to permit meaningful review[,] the appellate court must vacate the 
injunction and remand to the district court for further findings.‖  Lefante, 750 F.2d at 289 
(quotation omitted).   
 The District Court’s Order in this case is inadequate for us to engage in a 
meaningful review, and the record does not provide a clear explanation supporting the 
Court’s order.  Despite the contested facts and legal issues raised in Shulman’s motion, 
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the District Court’s Order granting the injunction contains no specific findings of facts or 
conclusions of law.  It concludes without explanation that Shulman is likely to prevail on 
the merits, likely to suffer irreparable harm, and is entitled to an injunction protecting a 
possible future damage award.  We need more than this in order to exercise our review 
function.  Thus, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.  
 
